Head Hen CMS end-to-end: dashboard lists all posts (drafts + published), Markdown editor with live preview + drag-drop image upload, Pillow media pipeline re-encoding every upload to JPEG, post CRUD + publish toggle + hard delete, About page edit, and double-submit CSRF cookie enforced on every admin mutating endpoint (Phase 3's TODO markers resolved). Slug auto-generated on create and server-locked once a post has been published. Unpublish preserves `published_at` so re-publish keeps original date ordering. Every admin write invalidates the read-side Post/Page TTL caches and records an `auth_events` audit row. CSRF middleware is narrow by design — issues/refreshes the `cb_csrf` cookie only on `GET /admin*`, and mutating endpoints opt in via `require_csrf_form` or `require_csrf_header` Depends. Public routes, healthz, and pre-auth login stay untouched. 64 new tests cover slugs, CSRF, media, admin posts/pages services, and end-to-end CMS routes. Tests never mock the DB — real temp SQLite files per the CLAUDE.md mandate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
260 lines
9.1 KiB
Python
260 lines
9.1 KiB
Python
"""Admin auth routes — magic-link login, consume, landing, logout.
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Every handler here is deliberately thin: it delegates to
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:class:`app.services.auth.AuthService` or
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:class:`app.services.sessions.SessionService` and translates the
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result into an HTTP response. No SQL, no crypto, no email building.
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Anti-enumeration contract
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-------------------------
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POST /admin/login always renders the same ``login_sent.html`` template
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with identical copy, identical status, and identical cookie state,
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regardless of whether the submitted address is on the allowlist. The
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only side-effects that differ are:
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- token row inserted (allowlisted)
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- email dispatched (allowlisted)
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- audit row has ``allowlisted=true`` vs ``false``
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GET /admin/auth/consume/{token} likewise uses a single failure page
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for every bad-token reason (missing / unknown / expired / already
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used). The specific reason lives only in the audit log.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import re
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from typing import Optional
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import structlog
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from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Form, Request
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from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse, RedirectResponse, Response
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from fastapi.templating import Jinja2Templates
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from app.dependencies.auth import require_admin
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from app.dependencies.csrf import require_csrf_form
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from app.models.entities import User
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from app.services.auth import AuthService, RateLimitedError
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from app.services.rate_limit import limiter
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from app.services.sessions import COOKIE_NAME, SessionService
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router: APIRouter = APIRouter(tags=["admin"])
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_log = structlog.get_logger(__name__)
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# Lightweight email regex. We intentionally avoid ``email-validator``
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# (not pinned in requirements.txt) and a full RFC-5322 parser; the goal
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# is only to reject empty strings and obviously-not-an-email submissions
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# before calling the allowlist. Full validation is unnecessary because
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# non-allowlisted addresses are silently ignored anyway.
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_EMAIL_RE: re.Pattern[str] = re.compile(
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r"^[^@\s]+@[^@\s]+\.[^@\s]+$"
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)
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def _get_templates(request: Request) -> Jinja2Templates:
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"""Return the app-scoped :class:`Jinja2Templates`."""
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return request.app.state.templates
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def _get_auth_service(request: Request) -> AuthService:
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"""Return the app-scoped :class:`AuthService`."""
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return request.app.state.auth_service
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def _get_session_service(request: Request) -> SessionService:
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"""Return the app-scoped :class:`SessionService`."""
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return request.app.state.session_service
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def _client_ip(request: Request) -> str:
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"""Best-effort client IP from the request.
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Starlette already respects ``X-Forwarded-For`` via the proxy-headers
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middleware Uvicorn installs with ``--proxy-headers``; that means
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``request.client.host`` is the real client IP.
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"""
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return request.client.host if request.client else ""
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def _user_agent(request: Request) -> str:
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"""Return the submitted User-Agent header (empty string if missing)."""
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return request.headers.get("user-agent", "")
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# GET /admin/login
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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@router.get("/admin/login", response_class=HTMLResponse, summary="Admin login form")
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def admin_login_form(
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request: Request,
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templates: Jinja2Templates = Depends(_get_templates),
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) -> HTMLResponse:
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"""Render the email-entry form.
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The login form is deliberately NOT CSRF-protected: the user is
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pre-authentication and no session cookie exists yet, so there is
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no authenticated context for a forged request to hijack. The
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``ADMIN_EMAILS`` allowlist and SlowAPI rate limit are what keep
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this endpoint safe.
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"""
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return templates.TemplateResponse(
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request,
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"admin/login.html",
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{"error": None, "email": ""},
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)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# POST /admin/login
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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@router.post("/admin/login", response_class=HTMLResponse, summary="Request magic link")
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@limiter.limit("5/15 minutes")
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def admin_login_submit(
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request: Request,
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email: str = Form(default=""),
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templates: Jinja2Templates = Depends(_get_templates),
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auth: AuthService = Depends(_get_auth_service),
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) -> Response:
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"""Handle the login form submission.
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Flow:
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1. Normalize + validate the email format. On format error we
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re-render ``login.html`` with a message (this is a UX concession
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— an invalid email shape is not a successful submission, so
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there's no enumeration risk).
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2. Call :meth:`AuthService.request_link`.
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3. Regardless of allowlist membership: render ``login_sent.html``
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with identical copy. On per-email rate-limit: render
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``rate_limited.html`` + 429.
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Rate limiting
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-------------
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The ``@limiter.limit`` decoration is applied dynamically from
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``app.main`` so tests can bypass it — see the route registration
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helper in ``app.main``.
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"""
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normalized = (email or "").strip().lower()
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if not normalized or not _EMAIL_RE.match(normalized):
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# Format error surfaces as a flash; there's nothing to leak
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# here because we haven't checked the allowlist yet.
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return templates.TemplateResponse(
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request,
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"admin/login.html",
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{
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"error": "Please enter a valid email address.",
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"email": email or "",
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},
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status_code=400,
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)
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ip = _client_ip(request)
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ua = _user_agent(request)
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try:
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auth.request_link(email=normalized, ip=ip, user_agent=ua)
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except RateLimitedError:
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# Per-email DB-side limit tripped. The SlowAPI IP-level limit
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# is handled separately via the registered exception handler.
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return templates.TemplateResponse(
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request,
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"admin/rate_limited.html",
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{},
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status_code=429,
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)
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return templates.TemplateResponse(
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request,
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"admin/login_sent.html",
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{},
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)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# GET /admin/auth/consume/{token}
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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@router.get(
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"/admin/auth/consume/{token}",
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summary="Consume magic-link token",
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)
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@limiter.limit("20/15 minutes")
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def admin_auth_consume(
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request: Request,
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token: str,
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templates: Jinja2Templates = Depends(_get_templates),
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auth: AuthService = Depends(_get_auth_service),
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sessions: SessionService = Depends(_get_session_service),
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) -> Response:
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"""Consume a magic-link token and, on success, set the session cookie.
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Failure path returns 400 + generic ``invalid or expired`` page.
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Success path sets ``cb_session`` and 303-redirects to ``/admin``.
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"""
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ip = _client_ip(request)
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ua = _user_agent(request)
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result = auth.consume(raw_token=token, ip=ip, user_agent=ua)
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if result is None:
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# Generic failure response — the audit log has the real reason.
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return templates.TemplateResponse(
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request,
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"admin/login_failed.html",
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{},
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status_code=400,
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)
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_user, _session, cookie_value = result
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# 303 forces the browser to GET /admin on the next request.
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response = RedirectResponse(url="/admin", status_code=303)
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response.set_cookie(value=cookie_value, **sessions.cookie_params())
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return response
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# The authenticated landing page (``GET /admin``) now lives in
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# :mod:`app.routes.admin_cms` as the dashboard. This module stays
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# scoped to pre-auth / auth-lifecycle endpoints.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# POST /admin/logout
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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@router.post("/admin/logout", summary="Log out the current admin")
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def admin_logout(
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request: Request,
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user: User = Depends(require_admin),
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sessions: SessionService = Depends(_get_session_service),
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_csrf: None = Depends(require_csrf_form),
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) -> Response:
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"""Revoke the current session and clear the cookie.
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Always issues a 303 redirect to ``/admin/login`` so browsers
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transparently follow and show the login form (with no cookie).
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"""
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from app.services.sessions import SessionService as _SS # noqa: F401
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# Look up the session again via the cookie so we can revoke it
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# and emit a properly-correlated audit row.
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cookie_value: Optional[str] = request.cookies.get(COOKIE_NAME)
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session = sessions.lookup(cookie_value)
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audit = request.app.state.audit_service
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if session is not None:
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sessions.revoke(session)
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audit.record(
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"session_revoked",
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email=user.email,
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user_id=user.id,
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ip=_client_ip(request),
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user_agent=_user_agent(request),
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detail={"session_id": session.token_hash[-6:]},
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)
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response = RedirectResponse(url="/admin/login", status_code=303)
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# Clear the cookie by setting an empty value with Max-Age=0 and the
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# same Path so the browser actually removes it.
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response.delete_cookie(key=COOKIE_NAME, path="/")
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return response
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