"""CSRF double-submit cookie service.

Protects admin-write endpoints against cross-site request forgery by
requiring a signed token to be submitted BOTH as a cookie and as a
form field / header. An attacker can forge requests but cannot read
the cookie (SameSite=Lax blocks cross-site automatic cookie sending,
and even if the browser sent it, cross-site JS still cannot read
cookies on this origin). Matching the submitted value to the cookie
value then proves the request originated from our own pages.

Design
------
- The cookie stores a signed opaque nonce. Signing prevents a malicious
  ad iframe (or any JS on a non-origin page) from producing a cookie
  value that would later match a crafted form submission.
- The nonce itself is 256-bit (``secrets.token_urlsafe(32)``), generated
  per-browser on first admin GET and reused for the session. Rotating
  per request would invalidate any still-open admin tab on every nav,
  which the small-scale admin UX cannot tolerate.
- Verification unsigns the submitted token and compares the raw nonce
  to the raw nonce unsigned from the cookie using :func:`hmac.compare_digest`
  (constant-time) to foreclose timing side channels.
- The cookie is ``HttpOnly=False`` so the minimal admin JS (live
  preview, upload) can read it to set the ``X-CSRF-Token`` header on
  fetch requests. This is the conventional double-submit cookie setup
  — the XSS risk is already mitigated by the Markdown sanitizer and
  the session cookie remains HttpOnly.

The service is a small collaborator: it does not know about FastAPI
routes, request objects, or templates. The :mod:`app.dependencies.csrf`
module wraps the verify call in a FastAPI dependency.
"""

from __future__ import annotations

import hmac
import secrets
from typing import Optional

import structlog
from itsdangerous import BadSignature, URLSafeTimedSerializer


_log = structlog.get_logger(__name__)


# Cookie name kept here as a module-level constant so routes,
# dependencies, and templates stay in sync.
CSRF_COOKIE_NAME: str = "cb_csrf"

# Default max age — matches the session TTL ceiling. A valid admin
# session already enforces the 30-day cap; the CSRF cookie merely
# piggybacks.
_DEFAULT_MAX_AGE_SEC: int = 30 * 86400


class CSRFService:
    """Issue and verify double-submit CSRF tokens.

    Parameters
    ----------
    signer:
        Pre-built :class:`itsdangerous.URLSafeTimedSerializer`. The
        caller is responsible for constructing it with
        ``salt="csrf"`` so a session-cookie token can never be
        replayed as a CSRF token and vice-versa.
    production:
        When True, the issued cookie carries the ``Secure`` flag. Dev
        (plain-HTTP 127.0.0.1) needs it off or the browser drops the
        cookie entirely.
    """

    def __init__(
        self,
        signer: URLSafeTimedSerializer,
        *,
        production: bool = False,
        max_age_sec: int = _DEFAULT_MAX_AGE_SEC,
    ) -> None:
        """Store the signer and cookie-policy flags by reference."""
        self._signer: URLSafeTimedSerializer = signer
        self._production: bool = production
        self._max_age_sec: int = int(max_age_sec)

    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
    # Issue
    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
    def issue(self, existing_cookie: Optional[str] = None) -> tuple[str, str]:
        """Return ``(token, cookie_value)`` — reuse or mint as appropriate.

        If ``existing_cookie`` is a valid signed nonce (still within
        TTL), we reuse the underlying nonce so the same token keeps
        working across GET / POST cycles in the same admin session.
        Otherwise we mint a fresh nonce.

        The cookie value and the form/header token value are the SAME
        signed string — this is the "double submit" contract. The
        verify path re-signs nothing; it just compares the unsigned
        raw nonces.
        """
        raw = self._unsign_or_none(existing_cookie)
        if raw is None:
            raw = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
        signed = self._signer.dumps(raw)
        # Token and cookie are both the signed string. Callers are free
        # to submit either in a form field OR a header; verify accepts
        # both shapes.
        return signed, signed

    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
    # Verify
    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
    def verify(
        self,
        *,
        cookie_value: Optional[str],
        submitted: Optional[str],
    ) -> bool:
        """Return True iff cookie + submitted token unseal to the same nonce.

        Both strings must unsign cleanly; a bad signature (tampered or
        wrong-key) on either side fails closed. Constant-time compare
        on the raw nonces prevents timing leaks of the nonce bytes.
        """
        if not cookie_value or not submitted:
            return False
        cookie_raw = self._unsign_or_none(cookie_value)
        submitted_raw = self._unsign_or_none(submitted)
        if cookie_raw is None or submitted_raw is None:
            return False
        return hmac.compare_digest(cookie_raw, submitted_raw)

    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
    # Cookie helpers
    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
    def cookie_params(self) -> dict:
        """Return kwargs for ``response.set_cookie`` matching our CSRF policy.

        Differences from :meth:`SessionService.cookie_params`:
        - ``httponly=False`` so the admin JS can read it for fetch
          requests.
        - Same ``SameSite=Lax`` + ``Secure=<prod>`` otherwise.
        """
        return {
            "key": CSRF_COOKIE_NAME,
            "httponly": False,
            "samesite": "lax",
            "secure": self._production,
            "max_age": self._max_age_sec,
            "path": "/",
        }

    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
    # Internals
    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
    def _unsign_or_none(self, value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[str]:
        """Return the raw nonce, or ``None`` on any signature failure.

        Centralizes the "fail closed" contract; never raises to callers.
        """
        if not value:
            return None
        try:
            return self._signer.loads(value, max_age=self._max_age_sec)
        except BadSignature:
            _log.info("csrf_bad_signature")
            return None