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45271e15ac
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| 45271e15ac | |||
| 0adecb908a | |||
| cd3b2e0694 |
18
Dockerfile
18
Dockerfile
@@ -98,14 +98,10 @@ HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=3s --start-period=10s --retries=3 \
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# Run Uvicorn directly. --proxy-headers + --forwarded-allow-ips make
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# Starlette's ProxyHeadersMiddleware trust X-Forwarded-* only from the
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# listed peer IPs. The trusted-IP value is env-driven so the image
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# can be reused across topologies:
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# - local: defaults to 127.0.0.1 (when running uvicorn on the host)
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# - docker/compose behind Caddy: set FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS="*" in .env
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# because the container's source IP is the bridge gateway, not
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# 127.0.0.1. Safe because the host only binds 127.0.0.1:8080 so
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# nothing off-host can reach uvicorn directly.
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# `sh -c exec` keeps uvicorn as PID 1 so SIGTERM still triggers a
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# graceful shutdown (exec form was fine before, but we need shell
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# expansion for ${FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS}).
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CMD ["sh", "-c", "exec uvicorn app.main:app --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8080 --proxy-headers --forwarded-allow-ips \"${FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS:-127.0.0.1}\""]
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# listed peer IPs (Caddy on the host). No --reload: this is a prod-shape
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# image; local hot-reload is a dev concern and runs outside Docker.
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CMD ["uvicorn", "app.main:app", \
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"--host", "0.0.0.0", \
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"--port", "8080", \
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"--proxy-headers", \
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"--forwarded-allow-ips", "127.0.0.1"]
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@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Chicken Babies R Us — production compose file.
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#
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# Meant for the Debian 12 VM behind Caddy. Unlike docker-compose.yml (which
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# builds the image from source for local dev), this file pulls the pre-built
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# image from the Gitea container registry so the VM stays a thin runner.
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#
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# Ansible responsibilities (not this file):
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# - render /opt/chicken-babies/.env with real secrets
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# - ensure data/ exists and is owned by uid:gid 10001:10001
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# sudo install -d -o 10001 -g 10001 /opt/chicken-babies/data/media
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# sudo install -d -o 10001 -g 10001 /opt/chicken-babies/data/backups
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# - `docker login git.sneakygeek.net -u <user> -p <REGISTRY_TOKEN>`
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# - copy this file as /opt/chicken-babies/docker-compose.yml
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# - run `docker compose pull && docker compose up -d`
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#
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# Update flow on the VM (after a CI build publishes a new :latest):
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# docker compose pull
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# docker compose up -d # restarts only if the image SHA changed
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# docker image prune -f # reclaim space from the old layers
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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services:
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web:
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image: git.sneakygeek.net/ptarrant/chicken_babies_site:latest
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# Docker pulls :latest on `docker compose pull`; no build context needed.
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pull_policy: always
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env_file:
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- .env
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# Override the Dockerfile CMD so uvicorn trusts X-Forwarded-* headers.
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# Caddy lives on another server (10.10.99.10) and speaks HTTP to this
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# VM on port 8080. Even so, the source IP *inside* the container is
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# the Docker bridge gateway (typically 172.17.0.1), NOT 10.10.99.10,
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# because Docker NATs the inbound connection. That means allowlisting
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# 10.10.99.10 would never match — uvicorn would still drop X-Forwarded-*
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# and Starlette would build http:// URLs under an https:// page,
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# tripping `img-src 'self'` CSP on the logo, fonts, etc.
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#
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# "*" is acceptable here because access to port 8080 is controlled
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# at the network layer (host firewall / VLAN) — only the Caddy box
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# can reach it. If you later move Caddy onto this same host, change
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# this back to a specific gateway IP.
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command: >
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uvicorn app.main:app
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--host 0.0.0.0
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--port 8080
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--proxy-headers
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--forwarded-allow-ips *
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ports:
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# Caddy on 10.10.99.10 reverse-proxies to <this-vm>:8080. Binding
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# on all interfaces keeps the compose portable; lock down access
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# with the VM's host firewall (nftables / ufw) or upstream
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# (OPNsense) to only permit 10.10.99.10 → :8080.
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- "8080:8080"
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volumes:
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# SQLite DB + media uploads live on the host so container rebuilds /
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# image rolls don't wipe content. The container runs as uid 10001;
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# the host dir must be chown'd to match (see Ansible notes above).
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- ./data:/app/data
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restart: unless-stopped
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# Docker picks up the HEALTHCHECK baked into the image. `docker compose
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# ps` surfaces health status; systemd / Ansible tasks can gate on it.
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# Container-level logging caps so a chatty bot run doesn't fill the
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# VM disk before the host-side logrotate catches it.
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logging:
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driver: json-file
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options:
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max-size: "10m"
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max-file: "5"
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