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fad417697a
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| 5aad7fd48f |
18
Dockerfile
18
Dockerfile
@@ -98,10 +98,14 @@ HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=3s --start-period=10s --retries=3 \
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# Run Uvicorn directly. --proxy-headers + --forwarded-allow-ips make
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# Run Uvicorn directly. --proxy-headers + --forwarded-allow-ips make
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# Starlette's ProxyHeadersMiddleware trust X-Forwarded-* only from the
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# Starlette's ProxyHeadersMiddleware trust X-Forwarded-* only from the
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# listed peer IPs (Caddy on the host). No --reload: this is a prod-shape
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# listed peer IPs. The trusted-IP value is env-driven so the image
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# image; local hot-reload is a dev concern and runs outside Docker.
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# can be reused across topologies:
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CMD ["uvicorn", "app.main:app", \
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# - local: defaults to 127.0.0.1 (when running uvicorn on the host)
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"--host", "0.0.0.0", \
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# - docker/compose behind Caddy: set FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS="*" in .env
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"--port", "8080", \
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# because the container's source IP is the bridge gateway, not
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"--proxy-headers", \
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# 127.0.0.1. Safe because the host only binds 127.0.0.1:8080 so
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"--forwarded-allow-ips", "127.0.0.1"]
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# nothing off-host can reach uvicorn directly.
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# `sh -c exec` keeps uvicorn as PID 1 so SIGTERM still triggers a
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# graceful shutdown (exec form was fine before, but we need shell
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# expansion for ${FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS}).
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CMD ["sh", "-c", "exec uvicorn app.main:app --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8080 --proxy-headers --forwarded-allow-ips \"${FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS:-127.0.0.1}\""]
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@@ -27,11 +27,31 @@ services:
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pull_policy: always
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pull_policy: always
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env_file:
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env_file:
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- .env
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- .env
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# Override the Dockerfile CMD so uvicorn trusts X-Forwarded-* headers.
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# Caddy lives on another server (10.10.99.10) and speaks HTTP to this
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# VM on port 8080. Even so, the source IP *inside* the container is
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# the Docker bridge gateway (typically 172.17.0.1), NOT 10.10.99.10,
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# because Docker NATs the inbound connection. That means allowlisting
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# 10.10.99.10 would never match — uvicorn would still drop X-Forwarded-*
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# and Starlette would build http:// URLs under an https:// page,
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# tripping `img-src 'self'` CSP on the logo, fonts, etc.
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#
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# "*" is acceptable here because access to port 8080 is controlled
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# at the network layer (host firewall / VLAN) — only the Caddy box
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# can reach it. If you later move Caddy onto this same host, change
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# this back to a specific gateway IP.
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command: >
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uvicorn app.main:app
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--host 0.0.0.0
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--port 8080
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--proxy-headers
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--forwarded-allow-ips *
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ports:
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ports:
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# Bind to loopback only. Caddy (on the host) proxies inbound 443 here.
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# Caddy on 10.10.99.10 reverse-proxies to <this-vm>:8080. Binding
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# Exposing on 0.0.0.0 would let anything on the LAN hit uvicorn
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# on all interfaces keeps the compose portable; lock down access
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# directly and bypass TLS termination + rate limits.
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# with the VM's host firewall (nftables / ufw) or upstream
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- "127.0.0.1:8080:8080"
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# (OPNsense) to only permit 10.10.99.10 → :8080.
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- "8080:8080"
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volumes:
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volumes:
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# SQLite DB + media uploads live on the host so container rebuilds /
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# SQLite DB + media uploads live on the host so container rebuilds /
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# image rolls don't wipe content. The container runs as uid 10001;
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# image rolls don't wipe content. The container runs as uid 10001;
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